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Abstract
We model an informed agent with information about the future value of an asset trying to maxi-
mize profits when subjected to a transaction cost as well as a market maker tasked with setting fair
transaction prices. In a single auction model, equilibrium is characterized by the unique root of a
particular polynomial. Analysis of this polynomial with small levels of risk-aversion and transaction
costs reveal a dimensionless parameter which captures several orders of asymptotic accuracy of the
equilibrium behaviour. In a continuous time analogue of the single auction model, incorporation of
a transaction costs allows the informed agent’s optimal trading strategy to be obtained in feedback
form. Linear equilibrium is characterized by the unique solution to a system of two ordinary dif-
ferential equations, of which one is forward in time and one is backward. When transaction costs
are in effect, the price set by the market maker in equilibrium is not fully revealing of the informed
agent’s private signal, leaving an information gap at the end of the trading interval. When consider-
ing vanishing transaction costs, the equilibrium trading strategy and pricing rules converge to their
frictionless counterparts.
Keywords: market microstructure, asymmetric information, price impact, transaction cost
1. Introduction
When traders place orders on a securities exchange, they face transaction frictions. Direct frictions
include exchange and brokerage fees, but consumers of liquidity also experience indirect costs. Liq-
uidity providers adjust their limit orders to reflect the information contained in incoming market
orders by moving their price quotes in the direction of order flow. This adversely affects traders who
take liquidity as their subsequent orders will be transacted at a less favourable price. Additionally,
if an aggressive order is large enough then it consumes all of the liquidity at the best available price
and the remainder of the order is executed at sequentially worse prices. This can be thought of as
a transaction cost which is dependent on the size of the aggressive order and the state of the order
book.
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Risk-aversion and transaction costs have been previously studied in the insider trading literature.
The authors Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) extend the discrete-time model of Kyle (1985) to
include an exponentially risk-averse insider. Furthermore, their model allows for multiple insiders
with the same level of risk-aversion who all receive identical information. Subrahmanyam (1998)
further extends the model of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) to include a quadratic transaction
cost for a risk-averse insider in discrete-time. Baruch (2002) extends the continuous-time model
which was first given by Kyle (1985) and generalized by Back (1992) by including risk-aversion.
In this work, we model an exponentially risk-averse (or risk-neutral) insider who faces a transaction
cost per share that is proportional to the size of the order. We first present a single-auction model
and classify the unique linear equilibrium. We show that the market maker’s equilibrium pricing
rule corresponds to the unique positive root of a particular polynomial determined by the model
parameters. An asymptotic expansion of the roots of the aforementioned polynomial is performed
for small transaction cost and small risk-aversion, which allows us to examine the effects of the
transaction cost relative to frictionless models.
We then formulate an analogous model in continuous-time and present a linear equilibrium classified
by the solution to a forward-backward ordinary differential equation (FBODE). We show that the
resulting FBODE has a unique solution and is explicitly solvable when the insider is risk-neutral. We
then analyze the effects of varying the model parameters on equilibrium using numerical solutions
of the associated FBODE. Although we cannot solve for equilibrium explicitly unless the insider is
risk-neutral, we are able to make conclusions about the nature of equilibrium in certain limiting cases
of the transaction cost parameter. In particular, when the transaction costs vanish the equilibrium
trading and pricing rules converge to their frictionless counterparts. This result could be used to
simplify the analysis of other similar asymmetric information models because it provides a family of
feedback controls which converge to the equilibrium control in the frictionless case.
The models formulated in this paper are also related to those of optimal execution literature. Often in
that literature, the pressure on the asset price exerted by order flow is referred to as permanent price
impact, while the immediate cost associated with market microstructure is referred to as temporary
price impact. In their seminal work, the authors of Almgren and Chriss (2001) model permanent and
temporary price impact by defining two distinct price processes: the midprice and the transaction
price. The midprice is the midpoint between the best quoted bid and ask prices set by liquidity
providers, and the transaction price is the average price per unit of asset at which the trader collects
proceeds from trades. The authors of Almgren and Chriss (2001) model permanent impact by letting
the drift of the midprice be an exogenous function of the trader’s order flow. Temporary impact is
modelled by defining the transaction price of trades to be equal to the midprice plus an exogenous
function of the trader’s order volume.
Our model also includes midprice and transaction price processes. As distinct from Almgren and
Chriss (2001), we directly model price setting market makers which allows for the permanent price
impact to be endogenous. However, we define a transaction price process that is analogous the
model of Almgren and Chriss (2001) by explicitly introducing an exogenous transaction cost. To be
consistent with the insider trading literature, we refer the permanent price impact effect simply as
price impact and temporary price impact effect as transaction cost.
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The continuous-time version of our model is a direct generalization of the continuous-time models
of the aforementioned papers Kyle (1985), Back (1992) (when the insider’s signal is Gaussian),
and Baruch (2002) (with constant volatility of noise trading). As such, some qualitative features of
equilibrium in these works also arise in the present paper, but there are also some notable differences.
In particular, a key feature of many other models with asymmetric information is that the asset price
is always fully revealing of the insider’s signal at the end of the trading horizon (the insider always
has incentive to exploit her informational advantage). This is not the case in our model when
the transaction cost is non-zero. As a consequence, revelation of the insider’s signal does contain
information not already incorporated in the publicly available price.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a single-auction model,
present the unique linear equilibrium, and analyze the effects of the transaction cost by performing
an asymptotic expansion for small transaction cost. We shift our focus to continuous-time in Section
3 and begin by presenting a continuous-time model in Section 3.1. We begin Section 3.2 by developing
the mathematical machinery necessary the subsequent presentation of the linear equilibrium, and we
finish the section by presenting a linear continuous-time equilibrium. In Section 4, we demonstrate
the effects on the equilibrium of the previous section of varying the model parameters. In Section 4.1,
we pay special attention to the transaction cost parameter by analyzing the limit of the equilibrium
as this parameter tends to zero and infinity. Some concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.
2. Single-Auction
In this section, we consider a single-auction market where the transaction price of the insider’s trades
incurs an additional cost per share which is linear with respect to the trade volume. After presenting
the model which describes the dynamics of trade and the objective of the insider and market maker,
we prove the existence of a unique equilibrium in this setting. We then investigate the effects of the
transaction cost on the associated equilibrium.
The single-auction model in this section is similar to work contained in Subrahmanyam (1998) for
the case of a single agent. Though structurally similar, this previous work never considers a model
in which risk-averse insiders interact with unpredictable noise traders. In that paper either the
insider is risk-neutral or the volume traded by the noise traders is directly observed by the insider
before submitting their own trade (in that case the stochasticity in the model comes from a random
endowment to the insiders). Some of our results are analogous to Subrahmanyam (1998), but there
are some distinctions, for example that our model guarantees equilibrium whereas the lack of noise
traders can give rise to situations with no equilibrium (see Lemma 2 of Subrahmanyam (1998)). We
include the single-auction results so that we may perform a more in-depth analysis of the equilibrium
through an asymptotic expansion, and for the sake of completeness before investigating a continuous-
time version of the model.
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2.1. Model
In the spirit of Kyle (1985), we consider a single-auction on a market with one risky asset that is
traded on an exchange with three types of traders: market makers who set the asset’s midprice, an
insider who has information about the future value of the asset, and noise traders. We let v denote
the ex-post liquidation value of the asset, and we assume that v ∼ N (v0,Σv0).
The insider receives the realization of v before the auction takes place, but this information is
unavailable to the public. Thus, she wishes to utilize her informational advantage by submitting an
order of size ∆x in an auction. We assume that the number of noise traders on the exchange is large,
and we denote the aggregate order of the noise traders by ∆z, which we assume to be distributed as
∆z ∼ N (0, σ2). The aggregate order of the insider and noise traders are submitted to the market
maker who observes on the total quantity ∆y, where
∆y = ∆x+ ∆z . (1)
The auction takes place in two phases. First, the insider and the noise traders submit orders to the
exchange, and second, the market maker observes the aggregate order ∆y and sets the midprice p.
We assume that the insider pays a transaction cost proportional to the size of her order so that the
effective transaction price is
p̂ = p+ c∆x , (2)
where c > 0 is a constant referred to as the transaction cost parameter. Note that as the insider sells
shares of the asset her transaction price is lower than the midprice, and, conversely, as the insider
purchases shares her transaction price is higher than the midprice.
The difference between the midprice, p, and the effective transaction price, p̂, could arise from
one of many sources. The interpretation given in Subrahmanyam (1998) is that of a transaction
tax, possibly invoked upon the market by a regulator. A different interpretation could be that the
effective transaction price is due to different preferences between a large number of market makers. In
previous works, it is assumed that there is a very large number of perfectly competitive risk-neutral
market makers which drives all of them to quote the same price. In reality, liquidity providers may
set different prices than each other, giving rise to a demand structure depending on their aggregate
quotes. We do not explicitly model this behaviour or interaction between market makers and instead
capture this effect through the linear dependence of transaction price on trade volume.
Without a loss of generality, we assume that the insider holds no shares of the asset before the
auction. The wealth of the insider after the trades are executed is thus
w = (v − p̂) ∆x . (3)
The insider would like to maximize the utility of her expected wealth w. That is, the insider chooses
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∆x to achieve
max
∆x
E[U(w) | v] , (4)
where U is the insider’s utility function. The market maker is tasked with setting prices efficiently.
That is, the market maker chooses the price p such that
p = E[v |∆y] . (5)
2.2. Single-Auction Equilibrium
We begin this section by defining what it means for a pricing rule and a trading strategy to form
an equilibrium. We then classify the unique linear equilibrium for an exponentially risk-averse (or
risk-neutral) insider.
We assume that the market maker and insider choose pricing rules and trading strategies, respectively,
as functions of information available to them during the auction. That is, the market maker chooses
the price p as a function of ∆y, and the insider chooses her order size ∆x as a function of v. Let P
and X be functions such that p = P (∆y) and ∆x = X(v).
Definition 1. A single-auction equilibrium (P,X) consists of a pricing rule P and trading
strategy X such that
• given the pricing rule P , the order ∆x given by the trading strategy X(v) achieves the maximum
in (4), and
• given the trading strategy X, the price p given by the pricing rule P (∆y) satisfies the efficiency
condition (5).
The pair (P,X) is a linear single-auction equilibrium if both P and X are linear functions of
their arguments.
Suppose that P is the set of pricing rules P ≡ P (∆y) and let P0 ⊂ P be the set of pricing rules
for which there exists a corresponding trading strategy X that satisfies (4). Similarly, let X be
the set of trading strategies X ≡ X(v) and let X0 ⊂ X be the set of trading strategies for which
there exists a pricing rule P that satisfies (5). The sets P0 and X0 induce mappings ρ : P0 → X
and ξ : X0 → P. A pricing rule P and trading strategy X form a single-auction equilibrium if
ρ(P ) ∈X0, ξ(X) ∈P0 and (P,X) = (ξ(X), ρ(P )).
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We will restrict our focus to the exponentially risk-averse (or risk-neutral) insider. For any constant
A ≥ 0, we define the utility function
U(w) =
{
w, A = 0
−e−Aw, A > 0 , (6)
and we refer to A as the risk aversion parameter.
Before presenting the classification of linear equilibrium it is helpful to introduce the constants
λK =
1
2
√
Σv0
σ2
, βK =
1
2λK
. (7)
The constants λK and βK correspond to the single-auction pricing rule and trading strategy, respec-
tively, of Kyle (1985). In that work, the market maker’s single-auction equilibrium pricing rule for
a risk-neutral insider is PK(∆y) = v0 + λK ∆y, and the corresponding optimal trading strategy is
XK(v) = βK(v − v0). We will write the equilibrium pricing rule and trading strategy of our model
in terms of λK which helps to illuminate the effect of the added transaction cost.
Theorem 2 (Single Auction Equilibrium). Choose A ≥ 0 and let U , defined in (6), be the
insider’s utility function. Then the unique linear single-auction equilibrium is given by
P (∆y) = v0 + λ∆y , (8)
X(v) = β (v − v0) (9)
where
β =
1
2 (λ+ c) + Aσ2 λ2
, (10)
and λ is the unique positive root of the polynomial
r(x) = A2 σ4 x5 + 4Aσ2 x4 + 4 (1 + Acσ2)x3 + 4 (2 c− Aσ2 λ2K)x2 + 4 (c2 − λ2K)x− 8 c λ2K . (11)
Proof For a proof see Section 6.1 in the appendix.
Intuitively, a risk-averse trader prefers to submit a smaller order compared to her risk-neutral coun-
terpart because the inventory holdings are exposed to the randomness associated with the noise
traders. For this reason one might expect that the insider submits smaller orders with as the value
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of A is increased. Correspondingly, less information about the true value of the asset would be
contained in the order signal ∆y received by the market maker, and she thus reduces the severity
of her price adjustment. One might also expect that as the transaction cost parameter c increases
it becomes less worthwhile for the insider to submit large orders, regardless of her risk preference,
thus leading to a smaller β and λ. Both of these statements are indeed true as summarized by the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Single Auction Parameter Dependence). Let P (∆y) = v0 +λ∆y and X(v) =
β(v− v0) be the pricing rule and trading strategy forming the unique single-auction equilibrium given
by Theorem 2. If A > 0 then
∂β
∂c
< 0 ,
∂β
∂A
< 0 ,
∂λ
∂c
< 0 ,
∂λ
∂A
< 0 .
Proof For a proof see Section 6.2 in the appendix.
The classification of equilibrium given by Theorem 2 is in terms of a root of a fifth degree polynomial.
In general the quantities λ and β involved in the equilibrium will not have closed form expressions in
terms of model parameters. However, we are able to find approximations to these quantities which
hold when certain model parameters are small. These approximations are given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 (Single Auction Approximation). Let P (∆y) = v0 + λ∆y and X(v) = β(v −
v0) be the pricing rule and trading strategy forming the unique single-auction equilibrium given by
Theorem 2, and define the dimensionless parameter
ν :=
λK σ
2A
2
+
c
λK
. (12)
Then the quantities λ and β admit the following approximations:
λ = λK
(
1− 1
2
ν2 + ν3
)
+ o(ν4) , (13)
β =
1
2λK
(
1− ν + 3
2
ν2
)
+ o(ν3) . (14)
Proof For a proof see Section 6.3 in the appendix.
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As should be expected, the approximations to λ and β both converge to their counterparts present
in Kyle (1985) as A, c → 0, namely λK and 1/(2λK). In addition, there are some other interesting
observations to be made about this result.
The first and most significant observation is that both approximations depend on the dimensionless
parameter ν as defined in (12), and not on the individual values of A or c. A priori, there is no reason
why this dimensionless parameter ν fully determines the approximations, and not the individual
values of A and c. The authors have verified that higher order approximations with respect to A
and c fully depend on their individual values, and thus expanding with respect to the dimensionless
parameter ν alone is not possible to higher order that what appears in the Proposition 4.
The second observation stems again from the dimensionless parameter ν, which means that both
parameters have the same qualitative effect on equilibrium locally around A = c = 0. The magnitude
of the effects, however, depend on other model parameters. For example, if λK is large, then increasing
A will have more effect on equilibrium than increasing c1. This can be made sense of intuitively from
the perspective of the insider. If Kyle’s model is taken as a reference, then λKσ
2 represents a
magnitude of price risk faced by the insider due to the random noise traders, and λK on its own
represents a cost of trading to the insider. If λK is large, then the insider faces a large amount of risk
and we would expect any increase in risk-aversion from zero to have a significant effect on equilibrium.
Similarly, when λK is large, increasing the value of c from zero represents a relatively small change
in the total trading cost to the insider and should have insignificant effect on equilibrium.
The third observation is that the approximation of λ does not have any first order correction terms.
This is an indication that locally around A = c = 0, the equilibrium value of λ is relatively robust
with respect to changes in A and c because it is affected only at second order and higher. The
expansion for β however does have first order corrections with respect to both parameters, so the
insider’s trading strategy does not retain the same level of robustness to small changes of A and c
from 0.
To demonstrate the accuracy of these approximations, we plot both the exact equilibrium quantities
and the approximations for various sets of parameters. For the sake of visual clarity we plot this
comparison with respect to a single scale parameter denoted θ which acts as follows: we fix values
of A and c and find the equilibrium quantities and the corresponding approximations after making
the replacements
A 7→ θ A , c 7→ θ c .
We then plot the results as a function of θ in order to observe convergence as θ → 0. The results are
shown in Figure 1 for three pairs of A and c. Due to the scaling introduced by θ, the actual values
of A and c are of less significance than their ratio. The curves which are shown would not be altered
by changing A and c such that their ratio is fixed after a reparameterization of θ.
1Recall that λK depends on the other market parameters Σ
v
0 and σ, so this remark depends on changing λK without
changing σ
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Figure 1: Dotted curves show the exact equilibrium quantities for risk-aversion level θA and transaction cost θc. Solid
curves show the approximation of equilibrium quantities given by Proposition 4. Other parameters are σ = 1 and
Σv0 = 1.
3. Continuous-Time Auction
In this section, we present a continuous-time model which incorporates an analogous transaction cost
to the previous section. After introducing the model in Section 3.1, we give the notion of market
equilibrium which we consider. Some mathematical machinery is then established which is necessary
for classifying equilibrium in continuous-time. When the insider is risk-neutral, we can solve for linear
equilibrium in closed form. When they are risk-averse, the equilibrium is classified by a solution to
an ODE, of which we prove there is always a solution. Finally, we analyze the dependence on the
model parameters of the equilibrium solution, and give closed form expressions for the limits of the
equilibrium as the transaction cost parameter tends to extreme values.
3.1. Continuous-Time Model
We consider a similar setting to the previous section with three types of market participants, except
orders are submitted and prices are set in continuous-time. Let the processes P = (Pt)0≤t≤T be the
midprice of the asset, X = (Xt)0≤t≤T be the insider’s inventory, and Z = (Zt)0≤t≤T be a standard
Brownian motion. The cumulative orders submitted by the noise traders up to time t is equal to
σZt, where σ > 0 is constant. We let Y = (Yt)0≤t≤T be the total number of shares submitted to the
market up to time t. That is,
Yt = Xt −X0 + σ Zt . (15)
As in the single-auction model, we assume that the market maker observes the aggregate order flow
Y but neither of the components X or Z. We let the time T value of the asset v be normally
distributed with mean v0 and variance Σ
v
0, independent of the Brownian motion Z. The insider is
privy to the realization of v at the initial time t = 0.
It is helpful to explicitly denote the sets of information available to the various market participants
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at a given time. We define the filtrations FYt and FZt to be the filtrations generated by the processes
Y and Z, respectively. As the market maker observes only Y , we define FMt = FYt to be the market
maker’s information. The insider is aware of her trades, so she can back out the path of liquidity
trades by observing historical prices (see Back (1992)), and the insider has received the realization
of v before trading begins. So we set the insider’s information to be F It = σ(FZt ∪ σ(v)).
We assume that insider employs trading strategies that yield an absolutely continuous inventory
process almost surely. To this end, we write
dXt = θt dt , (16)
and analogously to the single-auction model, we define the insider’s transaction price P̂ = (P̂t)0≤t≤T
to be
P̂t = Pt + c θt , (17)
where c is a positive constant.
The assumption that the insider’s inventory path is absolutely continuous may seem restrictive. In
most other model formulations with asymmetric information, the insider may trade according to
any process which is adapted to the filtration F It , including processes with discontinuities or diffusive
components. However, it is generally the case that in equilibrium the insider’s inventory is absolutely
continuous. We do not attempt to model the transaction cost for trading strategies which are not
absolutely continuous. There are many works in the context of portfolio optimization which include
transaction costs of various forms (among many others, see Magill and Constantinides (1976), Davis
and Norman (1990), and Muhle-Karbe et al. (2017)), but it is unlikely that the optimal strategies
which result in those models would be consistent with the notion of equilibrium that we consider.
At the end of the trading horizon, the insider’s wealth is XT v minus the cost of trading throughout
the period. Thus, the terminal wealth WT is given by
WT = XT v −
∫ T
0
P̂s θs ds . (18)
The insider chooses a strategy to maximize her expected utility of terminal wealth. That is, θ is
chosen to achieve
sup
θ∈A
E[U(WT ) | F I0 ] , (19)
where U is an increasing, concave function and the set of admissible strategies is
A = {θ | θ is F I-predicable and E
[∫ T
0
θ2t dt
]
<∞} . (20)
The market maker is tasked with setting the price of the asset efficiently at all times 0 ≤ t ≤ T and
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so should choose the price according to
Pt = E[v | FMt ] . (21)
We now define the concept of equilibrium in continuous-time. This concept is analogous to the
single-auction equilibrium concept of Section 2.2.
Definition 5. A continuous-time equilibrium (P,X) consists of a price process P and an in-
ventory process X such that
• given a price process P , the inventory process X achieves the supremum in (19), and
• given an inventory process X, the price process P is efficient, i.e. P satisfies (21).
3.2. Continuous-Time Equilibrium
The goal of this section is to classify a linear equilibrium in continuous-time for an exponentially
risk-averse or risk-neutral insider. We will restrict our consideration to pricing rules and trading
strategies that have a form which are analogous to those of the single-auction equilibrium presented
in Theorem 2. Namely, increments of the price set by the market maker will be linear with respect to
increments of trade volume, and the insider’s trading strategy will be linear with respect to v − Pt.
Before stating the classification of equilibrium in continuous-time we need to develop some additional
mathematical machinery. These are contained in Lemmas 6, 7, and 9.
Using expressions (16), (17), and (18), we rewrite the expression for terminal wealth WT as
WT =
∫ T
0
(v − Ps − c θs) θs ds , (22)
where we have taken X0 = 0 for simplicity. The computations that follow can be carried out with
X0 6= 0, but this choice will not affect the insider’s optimal trading strategy (it will have only a minor
effect on the insider’s value function).
We will develop optimal insider trading strategies by first fixing the market maker’s pricing rule and
then solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation associated with the optimization problem
(19). We will then subsequently verify that the solution is optimal. This motivates us to introduce
the dynamic version of 19 as
H(t, P ) = sup
θ∈A
E
[
U
(∫ T
t
(v − Ps − c θs) θs ds
) ∣∣∣∣F It ] . (23)
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For a given time t ∈ [0, T ] and midprice Pt, the quantity H(t, Pt) gives the optimal expected utility
that the insider can achieve by trading during the time interval [t, T ]. We refer to H as the insider’s
value function.
Lemma 6 (Insider’s Value Function and Optimal Strategy). Let A ≥ 0 and let the utility
function U be as defined in (6). Let λ be a positive, bounded, deterministic function such that the
Riccati differential equation
dh(t)
dt
= −(1− 2Acσ
2)λ2(t)
c
h2(t) +
λ(t)
c
h(t)− 1
4 c
, h(T ) = 0 , (24)
has a global solution h : [0, T ]→ R. Suppose the midprice process P is given by
Pt = v0 +
∫ t
0
λ(s) dYs, (25)
where Y is given in (15). Then the insider’s value function (23) is given by
H(t, P ) =
 − exp
{
−A
(
(v − P )2 h(t) + σ2 ∫ T
t
λ2(s)h(s) ds
)}
, A > 0 ,
(v − P )2 h(t) + σ2 ∫ T
t
λ2(s)h(s) ds , A = 0 ,
(26)
and the optimal strategy in feedback form is given by
θ∗t = β(t) (v − Pt), β(t) =
1− 2λ(t)h(t)
2 c
. (27)
Proof For a proof see Section 6.4 in the appendix.
In the statement of Lemma 6 we have eliminated consideration of many arbitrary pricing rules by
considering only functions λ for which there is a solution to the ODE (24). This is necessary in
establishing this lemma in generality, as it is easy to find2 functions λ for which this ODE does not
have a solution defined on all of [0, T ]. This is because for some pricing rules there may be incentive
for the insider to acquire arbitrarily large inventory positions which will push prices in her favour, and
then liquidating the acquired position when price impact is smaller, thereby making an unbounded
profit. We make more comments on how we avoid this issue after we present the continuous-time
equilibrium.
2If λ0 is relatively large and decreases linearly to λT which is relatively small, then the ODE will only have a
solution on an interval of the form (T ∗, T ] where T ∗ > 0
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We use an HJB approach to prove this lemma, and the elimination of many pricing rules from
consideration is analogous to a similar result in the standard Kyle model. If the HJB approach is
taken in the Kyle model, then it is straightforward to show that there is no solution to the HJB
equation if λ is not constant in the risk-neutral case, or if λ doesn’t have very specific dynamics in
the risk-averse case. Thus, acquiring an optimal trading strategy which is admissible requires the
discarding of many pricing rules. On the other hand, using the HJB approach in our setting with
transaction cost does have a significant difference compared to the standard Kyle model. Due to the
quadratic nature of the performance criteria, we are immediately provided with the feedback form of
the optimal trading strategy. In addition, the linear performance criteria in the Kyle model means
that the HJB equation reduces to a system of PDE’s rather than a single equation as in our model.
The addition of the transaction cost makes many of the mathematical components of our problem
more straightforward.
In the next Lemma we provide the details of the market maker’s task of setting efficient prices. Recall
that in the proof of Theorem 2 the pricing rule was shown to be efficient by applying the projection
theorem for normal random variables directly to the expectation E[v |∆y], where we had assumed
that the insider’s trading strategy was linear in v. Our approach in continuous-time is analogous,
but we need a generalization of the projection theorem to continuous-time. In following Lemma, we
assume the insider follows a linear trading strategy and apply optimal filtering theory to compute
E[v | FMt ].
Lemma 7 (Market Maker’s Efficient Pricing). Suppose that insider’s inventory process is spec-
ified by
dXt = β(t) (v − Pt) dt , (28)
for a deterministic function β. Then the process P specified by the dynamics
dPt = λ(t) dYt, P0 = v0 , (29)
where Y is given by (15) and
λ(t) =
β(t)Σ(t)
σ2
,
dΣ(t)
dt
= −σ2λ2(t) , Σ(0) = Σv0 , (30)
satisfies the efficiency condition (21). Furthermore, the function Σ is equal to the posterior variance
of v given the market maker’s information:
Σ(t) = E[(v − Pt)2|FMt ] . (31)
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Proof The result is a direct application of (Liptser and Shiryaev, 2001, Theorem 12.1). 
The previous two lemmas are analogous to the steps in the single-auction case. The reader will
recall that the proof of Theorem 2 was done in two steps. The first step was the computation of
the insider’s optimal strategy for a fixed, linear pricing rule. In discrete time, this came down to
solving an algebraic equation, of which Lemma 6 is the continuous-time analogue. The second step
was the computation of an efficient pricing rule for a fixed, linear trading strategy, and Lemma 7 is
the corresponding result in continuous-time.
We reduced the computation of the linear single-auction equilibrium to coupled algebraic equations,
which were subsequently reduced to a single algebraic equation. In continuous-time, we reduce the
computation of an equilibrium to two coupled, nonlinear ODEs for which one ODE is prescribed
an initial condition and the other is prescribed a terminal condition. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 8. Let T, ξ0, ξT ∈ R be constants with T > 0. Let x : R → R2 and F : R2 → R2. A
forward-backward ordinary differential equation (FBODE) is a system of the form
dx(t)
dt
= F (x(t)),
 x1(0) = ξ0x2(T ) = ξT . (32)
In the following lemma, we state the FBODE that will appear in our continuous-time equilibrium
and prove the existence and uniqueness of a solution.
Lemma 9 (Solution to FBODE). Let A ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, and Σv0 > 0. For x ∈ R2, let us define the
function F : R2 → R2 as
F (x) =
F1(x)
F2(x)
 , F1(x) = − σ2 x21
4 (c σ2 + x2)2
, F2(x) = −σ
2 x1 (c σ
2 + x2 − 2Ax22)
4 (c σ2 + x2)2
. (33)
Then the FBODE
dx(t)
dt
= F (x(t)) ,
 x1(0) = Σv0x2(T ) = 0 , (34)
has a solution. If c > 0 then this solution is unique and it satisfies x1(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and
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x2(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ). If c = 0 then the solution is unique if we impose x2(t) > 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ). In this case the solution satisfies x1(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ) and x1(T ) = 0.
In addition, when A = 0 the solution is given by
x1(t) = 2 c λ0 σ
2 + λ20 σ
2 (T − t), x2(t) = T − t
2λ0 (T − t) + 4 c , λ0 =
√
Σv0
σ2 T
+
c2
T 2
− c
T
, (35)
and when c = 0 the solution which satisfies x2(t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, T ) is given by
x1(t) =
4σ2 Λ2K (T − t)
(AΣv0 + 2S) (AΣ
v
0
2 t−T
T
+ 2S)
, x2(t) =
σ2 Λ2K (T − t)
AΣv0 + 2S
, ΛK =
√
Σv0
σ2 T
, S =
√(
AΣv0
2
)2
+Λ2K .
(36)
Proof For a proof see Section 6.5 in the appendix.
Note that the results of Lemma 9 include the possibility of c = 0 even though our model specifies
that c is positive. The fact that the FBODE in Lemma 9 has a desired solution for c = 0 will be
useful in proving the nature of equilibrium in the limit c→ 0, and so we include these results.
It is also useful to mention which equilibrium quantities are represented by the functions x1 and x2
as solutions to the FBODE. Taking x1 and x2 the solution when c > 0, we will construct equilibrium
by letting Σ(t) = x1(t) and h(t) = x2(t)/x1(t), which is well defined due to the result of Lemma 9
that x1(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Before giving a continuous-time equilibrium it is useful to define the constant
ΛK =
√
Σv0
σ2 T
. (37)
The constant ΛK is the continuous-time pricing rule of Kyle (1985). That is, when a risk-neutral
insider faces a risk-neutral market maker on a frictionless exchange, the processes specified by the
dynamics
dPt = ΛK dYt , P0 = v0 , (38a)
dXt =
1
ΛK (T − t) (v − Pt) dt , X0 = 0 , (38b)
form an equilibrium. Writing the risk-neutral continuous-time equilibrium in terms of ΛK will help
illuminate the effect that transaction costs have on the market participant’s respective strategies.
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Theorem 10 (Continuous-Time Equilibrium). Let U be as given in (6) for some A ≥ 0, and
let c > 0. Let x = (x1, x2) be the unique solution to the FBODE (34), and let Σ(t) = x1(t) and
h(t) = x2(t)/x1(t). Then the midprice process P and inventory process X specified by
dPt = λ(t) dYt , P0 = v0 , (39)
dXt = β(t) (v − Pt) dt , X0 = 0 , (40)
where Y is given in (15) and where
β(t) =
σ2
2 (c σ2 + Σ(t)h(t))
, (41a)
λ(t) =
Σ(t)
2 (c σ2 + Σ(t)h(t))
, (41b)
form a continuous-time equilibrium. Furthermore, Σ(t) = E[(v − Pt)2 | FMt ] and the value function
H is given by (26). When A = 0, λ(t) ≡ λ is a constant and
β(t) =
1
λ (T − t) + 2 c , (42a)
λ =
√
Λ2K +
c2
T 2
− c
T
. (42b)
Proof For a proof see Section 6.6 in the appendix.
Recall that in Lemma 6 we removed from consideration many pricing rules in which an associated
ODE did not have a solution, as failure to do so would result in the ODE solutions blowing up within
the interval [0, T ]. Our method of classifying equilibrium in Theorem 10 avoids this issue by taking
the function h as given (in terms of the unique solution to an FBODE which does not blow up), and
then specifying the pricing rule λ which yields h as the solution to the ODE (24).
Definition 5 defines what it means for processes (P,X) to form a continuous-time equilibrium. In
Theorem 10, we gave deterministic functions β and λ such that the processes defined by dPt = λ(t) dYt
and dXt = β(t) (v − Pt)dt with (P0, X0) = (v0, 0) form a continuous-time equilibrium. While the
functions (β, λ) do not themselves form an equilibrium, the functions (β, λ) correspond directly to a
linear equilibrium (P,X). In the sequel, we will refer to linear equilibria (P,X) using (β, λ), and we
refer to β as an equilibrium trading rule and λ as an equilibrium pricing rule.
We will now discuss and interpret some characteristics of the continuous-time equilibrium of Theorem
10.
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Proposition 11 (Trading and Pricing Rule Monotonicity). Let β and λ be the trading and
pricing rules, respectively, corresponding to the continuous-time equilibrium of Theorem 10. Then,
1. β is an increasing function of t,
2. if A > 0 then λ is a decreasing function of t.
Proof For a proof see Section 6.7 in the appendix.
In equilibrium, β is increasing in time and β(T ) = 1/2 c, so
0 < β(t) <
1
2 c
, t ∈ [0, T ) . (43)
To gain some intuition as to why the trading rule is bounded by 1/2c, let b(t) be an arbitrary trading
rule and consider the expression for terminal wealth
WT =
∫ T
0
b(t) (1− c b(t)) (v − Pt)2 dt . (44)
Thus, at time t the insider gains wealth at a rate equal to b(t) (1− c b(t)) (v − Pt)2. This expression
is positive for 0 < b(t) < 1/c and maximized at b(t) = 1/2c. However, in choosing b(t) = 1/2c price
impact effects are also maximized and this lowers the potential gain of wealth at future times. The
optimal balance of instantaneous and future gains is therefore achieved for trading rules which are
bounded by 1/2c.
In the absence of transaction costs, the authors of Kyle (1985) and Baruch (2002) show that in
equilibrium both the risk-neutral and exponentially risk-averse insider, respectively, take trading
rules β that blow up as t approaches T so as to force the midprice to v, resulting in Σ(T ) = 0. For
a non-zero transaction cost c, the discussion above shows that an insider of any risk tolerance never
wishes to choose β > 1/2c. In this setting, the insider does not reveal the true value of the asset to
the market maker by the end of the trading period i.e. Σ(T ) > 0.
4. Parameter Dependence
In this section, we discuss the dependence of the equilibrium of Theorem 10 on model parameters.
First we summarize the effects of varying model parameters on the continuous-time equilibrium by
numerically solving the associated FBODE. Then we study the limits of the equilibrium rules as the
transaction cost parameters are taken to extreme values.
In analyzing the effects of varying the model parameters on the resulting equilibria, we consider
the solution, x, to the FBODE (34) to be a function of the underlying parameters x(t) ≡ x(t; Θ),
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Figure 2: Shown are the functions β, λ, and Σ in equilibrium for various values of the transaction cost parameter, c.
Other parameter values are A = 1, σ = 1, and Σv0 = 0.5.
where Θ is a collection of parameters of interest. An ideal approach would then be to differentiate
the FBODE (34) with respect to Θi to get dynamics of ∂x/∂Θi. Unfortunately the non-linearities
make this approach highly intractable, and so we resort to demonstrating these dependencies by
numerically solving the FBODE for various sets of the underlying parameters.
In Figure 2 we show the effect of varying the transaction cost parameter c. As would be expected
of the trading rule β, when there are larger transaction costs the insider trades less aggressively as
demonstrated in the left panel. Consequently, the price impact λ shown in the middle panel decreases
for larger transaction costs because net order flow contains less information. In addition the variance
of the market maker’s estimate decreases more slowly and price discovery takes comparatively more
time, as seen in the right panel.
In Figure 3 we show the effect of varying the risk-aversion parameter A. These results are qualitatively
similar to those found in Baruch (2002). In particular, larger values of A mean that the insider trades
more aggressively at the beginning of the trading interval, as seen in the left panel by larger values of
the trading rule β, because this is when they are exposed to the greatest amount of risk posed by the
noise traders. At the end of the trading interval, the trading rule converges to the same finite value
regardless of risk-aversion level because the remaining risk exposure converges to zero as t → T .
The finite limit is a consequence of the positive transaction cost c, whereas in Baruch (2002) this
limit would be infinite. The more aggressive trading at the beginning of the trading interval means
there is more information contained in the net order-flow, and thus we see in the middle panel that
price impact is larger at earlier times compared to later times for any fixed value of risk-aversion
A > 0. The right panel demonstrates that price discovery also occurs faster when there is increased
risk-aversion.
In both Figure 2 and Figure 3 we note that the terminal conditional variance of the asset value is
strictly positive. This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 9 where it is shown that the solution
to the FBODE (34) satisfies x1(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This means that the price process is not fully
revealing of the asset’s value as t→ T , unlike other frictionless models where equilibrium results in
limt→T Pt = v almost surely.
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Figure 3: Shown are the functions β, λ, and Σ in equilibrium for various values of the risk-aversion parameter, A.
Other parameter values are c = 0.2, σ = 1, and Σv0 = 0.5.
4.1. Equilibrium Limits
In this section, we study the limiting behaviour of the equilibrium rules β and λ of Theorem 10 with
respect to the transaction cost parameter c. The following proposition summarizes this behaviour as
the transaction cost is taken towards its extremes.
Proposition 12 (Limiting Transaction Cost Dependence). For fixed A ≥ 0,
lim
c→∞
β(t; c) = 0 , (45)
lim
c→∞
λ(t; c) = 0 , (46)
lim
c→0
β(t; c) =
AΣv0
2
+
√(
AΣv0
2
)2
+ Λ2K
 1
Λ2K(T − t)
, (47)
lim
c→0
λ(t; c) =
Λ2K
AΣv0
2
· 2t−T
T
+
√(
AΣv0
2
)2
+ Λ2K
. (48)
The limits (45) and (46) hold uniformly for t ∈ [0, T ], and the limits (47) and (48) hold uniformly
on any compact subinterval of [0, T ).
Proof For a proof see Section 6.8 in the appendix.
The two limits in (45) and (46) indicate that for sufficiently large transaction cost, the equilibrium
essentially consists of the insider doing nothing and therefore there being no informational content
to order flow (as it would be comprised of only noise trades). This result is expected given that any
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profits earned by the insider would be more than canceled out by the losses suffered from significant
costs.
The two limits in (47) and (48) correspond to the equilibrium trading rule and pricing rule of in
a setting where there is no transaction cost as in Kyle (1985), Back (1992), and Baruch (2002).
This is significant because in our model the existence of a feedback form for the trading strategy
relies on strict positivity of the transaction cost parameter. Typically in this style of model of
asymmetric information, the HJB approach does not result in a feedback form for the optimal
trading strategy. Proposition 12 shows that in this case the correct equilibrium trading and pricing
rules for a frictionless model can be obtained by adding an appropriate friction and then taking a
limit as this friction vanishes. With a feedback form of the insider’s trading strategy, some of the
analysis becomes more straightforward, so this limiting technique could be applied in other settings
of asymmetric information where the equilibrium rules are not as straightforward to classify.
An important step in obtaining this result is in identifying appropriate processes which will not have
a discontinuity at c = 0. When considering a vanishing friction term, some quantities can become
discontinuous at t = T . In our model, this will happen with the function h which appears in the
insider’s value function (26). To illustrate, in our model with c > 0 we must have h(T ) = 0. But
in frictionless equilibrium models it is typically the case that limt→T h(t) > 0 (in Kyle (1985) h is a
positive constant). Thus it is impossible to have a well behaved limit as c→ 0. However, our model
also results in Σ(T ) > 0 when c > 0, which means that the product Σ(t)h(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ) and
Σ(T )h(T ) = 0. But these relations also hold in frictionless models, and so one of the appropriate
functions to use in the classification of equilibrium is the product Σ(t)h(t), which is represented by
x2(t) in Lemma 9 and Theorem 10.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the results of Kyle (1985), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) and Baruch
(2002) by adding friction to the market in the form of a transaction cost which is linear in the
insider’s order size. We consider an exponentially risk-averse insider, allowing for the possibility of
risk-neutrality. We begin by modeling a single-auction exchange and providing the corresponding
unique market equilibrium in the form of an algebraic equation. We then demonstrate the effect
of both the transaction cost and risk-aversion on the equilibrium by asymptotically expanding the
algebraic equation about the frictionless risk-neutral equilibrium for small transaction cost and small
risk-aversion. This procedure results in a single dimensionless quantity which determines an accurate
expansion of the trading strategy to second order and the pricing rule to third order.
We then formulate an analogous market model in continuous-time. The mathematical machinery
needed for the presentation of a linear market equilibrium in continuous-time is more sophisticated
than that of the single-auction equilibrium. We develop an optimal trading strategy for an exponen-
tially risk-averse insider by explicitly solving the HJB equation associated with optimization problem
(19). We then give the filtering equations which provide an efficient price process for a fixed insider
strategy. The main result is Theorem 10, which gives a linear, continuous-time market equilibrium
in terms of the solution to the FBODE (34), for which we show there exists a unique solution.
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There are several qualitative similarities between the equilibria of the frictionless case and ours. First,
linear equilibria exist in both cases and are given in terms of the solutions to differential equations.
Additionally, the equilibrium insider trading rule β is increasing in time, and the equilibrium market
maker’s pricing rule λ is constant in the risk-neutral setting and decreasing in time in the risk-
averse setting. However our model also has some properties which are not typical in many models
of asymmetric information. The market maker’s conditional variance Σ has the property Σ(T ) > 0,
as distinct from the frictionless case in which Σ(T ) = 0 meaning that the true value of the asset v is
not reveled to the market maker by time T .
The effects of varying model parameters is investigated by numerically computing the equilibrium
strategies and by also explicitly computing some limits of equilibrium processes β and λ as transaction
cost parameter c tends to the values zero and infinity. We show that β and λ converge to the
frictionless strategies of Baruch (2002) as c→ 0 and converge to zero as c→∞. Since the addition
of friction to the continuous time model provides a feedback control, and the equilibrium processes
β and λ converge to their frictionless counterparts when c → 0, this could be used as a technique
to study other frictionless models of asymmetry in which a feedback control is not directly obtained
from the HJB approach.
6. Appendix A
6.1. Proof of Theorem 2
First we show that r has a unique positive root. Define the function
s(λ) = 2 (λ+ c) + Aσ2 λ2 . (49)
We will see later that s(λ) > 0 is the second order condition required for optimality of the trading
strategy. The polynomial r can be written as
r(λ) = λ (s2(λ) + 4λ2K)− 4λ2K s(λ) , (50)
and we note that r(λ) = 0 if and only if
λ (s2(λ) + 4λ2K) = 4λ
2
K s(λ) . (51)
The left and right sides of (51) are both polynomials in λ with positive coefficients, and therefore are
both strictly increasing functions of λ ≥ 0. Furthermore, for any A ≥ 0 the degree of the left hand
side polynomial is strictly greater than the degree of the right hand side polynomial, and when λ = 0
the left hand side of (51) is zero and the right hand side is positive. Therefore, (51) has exactly one
positive solution, and hence r has exactly one positive root.
The rest of the proof is divided into the two cases A = 0 and A > 0. Some related expressions are
different between the two cases, but the structure of the proof in both cases is identical. First, we
suppose that the insider’s trading strategy is a linear function of v and show the efficient pricing
rule is linear. Then, we suppose the market maker’s pricing rule is linear and show that the insider’s
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optimal trading strategy is linear. Matching coefficients gives the result.
Case A = 0: First, we suppose that the market maker chooses p as a linear function of ∆y. Namely,
we let P (∆y) = µ+ λ∆y, where µ and λ are constants. When the market maker follows the pricing
rule P , the insider’s transaction price is given by
p̂ = µ+ λ∆y + c∆x = µ+ (λ+ c) ∆x+ λ∆z . (52)
Thus,
E[U(w) | v] = E[(v − p̂) ∆x| v] = E[(v − µ) ∆x− (λ+ c) ∆x2 − λ∆x∆z | v] (53)
= (v − µ) ∆x− (λ+ c) ∆x2 . (54)
The second order condition for optimality is λ + c > 0, which is equivalent to s(λ) > 0. Assuming
this is satisfied, the choice of
∆x ≡ X(v) = v − µ
2 (λ+ c)
, (55)
maximizes (54) for any v. We note that for linear pricing rules P linear trading strategies X are
optimal even if we allow X to be a nonlinear function.
Now we assume that the insider chooses ∆x to be a linear function X of the ex-post price v. Specif-
ically, the insider chooses X(v) = α + β v, where α and β are constants. Then, by the projection
theorem for normal random variables we have
E[v |∆y] = E[v |α + β v + ∆z] = E[v] + E[(v − E[v])(∆y − E[∆y])]
E[(∆y − E[∆y])2] (∆y − E[∆y])
= v0 +
4λ2K β
1 + 4λ2K β
2
(∆y − α− β v0)
=
v0 − 4λ2K αβ
1 + 4λ2K β
2
+
4λ2K β
1 + 4λ2K β
2
∆y . (56)
By examining (55) and (56), we see that for (P,X) ≡ (P (∆y), X(v)) = (µ+ λ∆y, α+ β v) to be an
equilibrium, it must be that
α = −β µ, µ = v0 − 4λ
2
K αβ
1 + 4λ2K β
2
, (57a)
β =
1
2 (λ+ c)
, λ =
4λ2K β
1 + 4λ2K β
2
, (57b)
subject to the constraint s(λ) > 0.
Immediately, we get from (57a) that in equilibrium µ = v0 and α = −β v0, which gives the insider’s
trading strategy X(v) = β (v − v0). Recall that the insider’s second order condition is satisfied if
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s(λ) > 0. Inserting β into the expression for λ in (57b), we see that λ satisfies (51). If λ ≤ 0 then
from (51) we see that s(λ) ≤ 0, contradicting optimality of ∆x. Therefore, λ is the unique positive
root of the polynomial r.
Case A > 0: First, suppose that the market maker chooses p as a linear function of ∆y so that
P (∆y) = µ + λ∆y, where µ and λ are constants. When the market maker follows the pricing
strategy P , then the insider’s transaction price p̂ is given by (52). Thus,
E[U(w)|v] = E[− exp{−A(v − p̂)∆x}|v]
= − exp{−A(v − µ)∆x+ A(λ+ c)∆x2 + 1
2
A2λ2σ2∆x2} . (58)
The second order condition for optimality is 2(λ + c) + Aσ2λ2 > 0 which is equivalent to s(λ) > 0.
Assuming this is satisfied, the choice of
∆x ≡ X(v) = v − µ
2 (λ+ c) + Aσ2 λ2
(59)
maximizes (58) for any v. We note that for linear pricing rules P linear trading strategies X are
optimal even if we allow X to be a nonlinear function.
Now, suppose that the insider chooses the linear trading strategy X(v) = α+ β v. Then E[v |∆y] is
given by (56).
By examining (56) and (59), we see that for (P,X) ≡ (P (∆y), X(v)) = (µ+ λ∆y, α+ β v) to be an
equilibrium we must have
α = −β µ, µ = v0 − 4λ
2
K αβ
1 + 4λ2K β
2
, (60a)
β =
1
2 (λ+ c) + Aσ2 λ2
, λ =
4λ2K β
1 + 4λ2K β
2
, (60b)
where s(λ) > 0. The rest of the proof is identical to the case A = 0. 
6.2. Proof of Proposition 3
In the proof of Theorem 2, we saw that when A > 0 the equilibrium β and λ satisfy (60b). Inserting
λ into β in (60b) we get that in equilibrium β satisfies
q(β) := 32 c λ4K β
5 + 16λ4K β
4 + 16λ2K (Aλ
2
K σ
2 + c) β3 + 2 c β − 1 = 0 , (61)
with β > 0. We see that for fixed x > 0 we have ∂q(x)/∂c > 0 and ∂q(x)/∂A > 0. Since q(x)
is a strictly increasing function of x, we therefore must have ∂β/∂c < 0 and ∂β/∂A < 0. Taking
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derivatives of λ in (60b) with respect to c and A yields
∂λ
∂c
=
4λ2K (1− 4λ2K β2)
(1 + 4λ2K β
2)2
∂β
∂c
, (62)
∂λ
∂A
=
4λ2K (1− 4λ2K β2)
(1 + 4λ2K β
2)2
∂β
∂A
. (63)
Therefore,
∂λ
∂c
< 0 ,
∂λ
∂A
< 0 ⇐⇒ β < 1
2λK
= βK . (64)
We have already shown that β is strictly decreasing with respect to c and A, and in particular we
have β ≤ βK with equality only when c = A = 0. Thus, λ is strictly decreasing with respect to both
c and A. 
6.3. Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of this proposition relies on the result that the roots of a polynomial depend on the
coefficients analytically in a neighbourhood of a given root (see Brillinger (1966)). With this in mind
we write λ and β as a power series in the quantities A and c as follows:
λ =
∞∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
λ˜i,j A
i cj , (65)
β =
∞∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
β˜i,j A
i cj . (66)
Our approximation corresponds to computing each λ˜i,j for i+ j ≤ 3 and each β˜i,j for i+ j ≤ 2, the
remainder of the higher order terms being either o(A4 + c4) (for λ) or o(A3 + c3) (for β).
We first substitute the expansion for λ into the polynomial r(x) given in (11) and recall that λ is
the unique positive root of this polynomial. We then collect terms according to the powers of A and
c and set each term equal to zero individually. This results in a system of 10 equations3 which does
not have a unique solution. However, inspection shows that the coupling of the equations is arranged
in such a way that the first appearance of each quantity to be solved for is linear, with the exception
of λ˜0,0. Thus, given λ˜0,0, every other λ˜i,j is solved for uniquely. Because we require λ to be positive,
we must use the solution which corresponds to a positive value of λ˜0,0, of which there is only one
3The equations are large and tedious, so are displayed in a subsequent appendix
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(the other roots are zero and negative). The resulting solution is
λ˜00 = λK , λ˜10 = 0 , λ˜01 = 0 , λ˜20 = −1
8
σ4 λ3K , λ˜11 = −
1
2
σ2 λK ,
λ˜02 = −1
2
1
λK
, λ˜30 =
1
8
σ6 λ4K , λ˜21 =
3
4
σ4 λ2K , λ˜12 =
3
2
σ2 , λ˜03 =
1
λ2K
.
By letting ν =
1
2
λK σ
2A +
c
λK
we are able to write the truncated sum corresponding to the above
coefficients and perform some elementary factoring which yields∑
i+j≤3
λ˜i,j A
i cj = λK
(
1− 1
2
ν2 + ν3
)
.
This is the desired form as given in the statement of the Proposition.
Solving for β˜i,j for i+ j ≤ 2 is performed through essentially the same process, except the expansion
(66) is substituted into the polynomial q(x) defined in (61). By collecting powers of A and c and
setting each to zero individually, this once again yields a system of 6 equations4. The resulting
system of equations does not have a unique solution, but given β˜0,0 the remainder of the equations
to be solved are linear. There is only one value of β˜0,0 which ensures β is positive (the other roots
being negative or imaginary). Solving the remaining linear equations yields
β˜00 =
1
2λK
, β˜10 = −1
4
σ2 , β˜01 = − 1
2λ2K
,
β˜20 =
3
16
σ4 λK , β˜11 =
3
4
σ2
λK
, β˜02 =
3
4λ3K
.
The truncated sum corresponding to these coefficients can again be factored to give∑
i+j≤2
β˜i,j A
i cj =
1
2λK
(
1− ν + 3
2
ν2
)
.
This is the desired form as given in the statement of the Proposition. 
6.4. Proof of Lemma 6
We consider the cases A = 0 and A > 0 separately.
4Similarly, shown in a subsequent appendix
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Case A = 0: When A = 0, U(w) = w, and the value function (23) becomes
H(t, P ) = sup
θ∈A
E
[∫ T
t
(v − Ps − c θs) θs ds
∣∣∣∣F It ] . (67)
Associated with this stochastic control problem is the HJB partial differential equation
∂tH + sup
θ
{
1
2
σ2 λ2(t) ∂PPH + θ λ(t) ∂PH + (v − P − c θ) θ
}
= 0 , H(T, ·) = 0 . (68)
It can be checked by direct substitution that the solution of this equation is given by (26) when h
satisfies the ODE (24). The supremum in (68) is achieved at
θ∗(t, P ) = β(t) (v − P ), β(t) = 1− 2λ(t)h(t)
2 c
. (69)
All that remains to be shown is that this feedback form of θ∗ yields an admissible trading strategy.
Optimality of θ∗ then follows from a standard verification argument (see Pham (2009)). To this end,
define an auxilliary process Q = (Qt)0≤t≤T by
Qt = Pt − v .
Then under the control θ∗, we have the dynamics
dQt = −λ(t) β(t)Qt dt+ λ(t)σ dZt , Q0 = v0 − v .
This stochastic differential equation is linear and therefore has a unique strong solution. Further,
since v0−v is Gaussian, the resulting solution is a Gaussian process (see Karatzas and Shreve (2012)
Section 5.6). This gives
E
[∫ T
0
(θ∗s)
2 ds
]
= E
[∫ T
0
β2(s)Q2s ds
]
<∞ .
In addition, Q has continuous paths and thus the trading strategy is predictable, and therefore
admissible.
Case A > 0: When A > 0, U(w) = − exp(−Aw), and the value function (23) becomes
H(t, P ) = sup
θ∈A
E
[
− exp
{
−A
∫ T
t
(v − Ps − c θs) θs ds
} ∣∣∣∣F It ] . (70)
This stochastic control problem has the associated HJB partial differential equation
∂tH + sup
θ
{
1
2
σ2 λ2(t) ∂PPH + θ λ(t) ∂PH − A (v − P − c θ) θ H
}
= 0, H(T, ·) = −1 . (71)
Once again, it can be checked by direct substitution that this equation has solution given by (26). The
resulting feedback form of the control is again linear with respect to v − P , and thus the remainder
of the proof is identical to the risk-neutral case. 
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6.5. Proof of Lemma 9
In this section, we present a proof of Lemma 9 for the case A > 0. The proof for A = 0 is
essentially the same but more straightforward, and the solution given by (35) can be checked by
direct substitution.
Proof of Lemma 9 We first consider c > 0. Inspection of equation (34) shows that any solution
must have x1 a decreasing function, so we look for a solution in which x2(t) = ρ(x1(t)) for some
function ρ. This gives
dρ
dx1
=
dx2/dt
dx1/dt
=
c σ2
x1
+
ρ
x1
− 2Aρ
2
x1
. (72)
This ODE has general solution
ρ(x1) =
(γ + 1)xγ1 − (γ − 1) k
4A (xγ1 + k)
, (73)
γ =
√
1 + 8Acσ2 , (74)
for arbitrary k ∈ R. The value of k must be chosen to match the boundary condition x2(T ) =
ρ(x1(T )) = 0. We can immediately rule out k = 0 because then x2(t) = ρ(x1(t)) becomes a non-zero
constant contradicting the boundary condition x2(T ) = 0. Therefore, we search for non-zero k such
that g(k) = 0, where
g(k) = (γ + 1)xγ1(T ; k)− (γ − 1) k ,
and where by substituting (73) into (33) we have that x1 satisfies
dx1
dt
(t; k) = f1(x1(t; k); k) , x1(0; k) = Σ
v
0 , (75)
f1(x1; k) = − 16A
2 σ2 x21 (x
γ
1 + k)
2(
(γ + 1)2 xγ1 + (γ − 1)2 k
)2 , (76)
where we have made the dependence of x1 on the parameter k explicit. Inspection of (75) shows
that x1(t; k) must be positive for all t ∈ [0, T ], and so we must have k > 0 in order to have g(k) = 0.
We now show that there exists exactly one value of k > 0 which provides this solution.
To this end we show that for k > 0, x1(T ; k) is decreasing with respect to k. As f1 is continuously
differentiable with respect to k, we have that x1(T ; k) is as well (see Hartman (2002)). By setting
z(t; k) = ∂x1(t; k)/∂k, we have
∂z(t; k)
∂t
=
∂f1(x1(t; k); k)
∂x1
z(t; k) +
∂f1(x1(t; k); k)
∂k
, z(0; k) = 0, (77)
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where
∂f1(x1; k)
∂x1
= −
32A2 σ2 x1 (k + x
γ
1)
(
(γ + 1)xγ1 − (γ − 1) k
)2
(
(γ + 1)2 xγ1 + (γ − 1)2 k
)3 , (78)
∂f1(x1; k)
∂k
= − 128A
2 γ σ2 xγ+21 (x
γ
1 + k)(
(γ + 1)2 xγ1 + (γ − 1)2 k
)3 . (79)
Since x1(t; k) > 0 for t ∈ [0, T ] and k > 0, we have
∂f1(x1(t; k); , k)
∂x1
≤ 0, ∂f1(x1(t; k); k)
∂k
< 0 . (80)
Thus, by examining (77), we see that ∂x1(t; k)/∂k < 0 for all t ∈ (0, T ] and k > 0. This establishes
that x(T ; k) is decreasing with respect to k, and therefore any solution to g(k) = 0 must be unique.
Let kr and kl be given by
kr =
γ + 1
γ − 1 (Σ
v
0)
γ , kl =
γ + 1
γ − 1x
γ
1(T ; kr) .
Then we see 0 < kl < kr and g(kl) > 0 > g(kr). Thus we have a unique k > 0 such that
x2(T ; k) = 0. This establishes existence and uniqueness of the solution to (34) along with the
property that x1(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The fact that x2(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ) then follows
immediately from (73) together with the boundary condition x2(T ) = 0 and that x1(t) is decreasing.
We now consider c = 0 and proceed similarly by looking for a function ρ such that x2(t) = ρ(x1(t)).
In this case the ODE satisfied by ρ is
dρ
dx1
=
ρ
x1
− 2Aρ
2
x1
,
which has solution
ρ(x1) =
x1
2A (x1 + k)
,
for arbitrary k ∈ R. We immediately eliminate k = 0 for the same reason as before. However, we
cannot eliminate k < 0 from consideration. The ODE for x1 now takes the form
dx1
dt
(t; k) = −A2 σ2 (x1(t; k) + k)2 , x(0; k) = Σv0 ,
which has the unique solution
x1(t; k) =
Σv0 − k(Σv0 + k)A2σ2t
1 + (Σv0 + k)A
2σ2t
. (81)
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Enforcing the boundary condition x2(T ; k) = 0 yields two possible values of k:
k = −Σ
v
0
2
(
1±
√
1 +
4
A2 σ2 T Σ20
)
. (82)
This results in one positive and one negative value of k, both of which provide solutions to the
FBODE (34). However, the negative value of k results in x2(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ). By enforcing
x2(t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, T ) we must discard the negative value of k and are left with a unique solution.
From (81) we have immediately that x1(t; , k) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ) and x1(T ) = 0. 
6.6. Proof of Theorem 10
First we fix (x1, x2) to be the unique solution to the FBODE (34) with x1(0) = Σ
v
0. Suppose the
price dynamics are given by
dPt = λ(t) dYt , Pt = v0 ,
with λ(t) given by
λ(t) =
Σ(t)
2 (c σ2 + Σ(t)h(t))
,
where Σ(t) = x1(t) and h(t) = x2(t)/x1(t) as in the statement of the Theorem. A straightforward
computation shows that
dh(t)
dt
=
2Aσ2 Σ2(t)h2(t)− c σ4
4 (c σ2 + Σ(t)h(t))2
,
and in addition, that
−(1− 2Acσ
2)λ2(t)
c
h2(t) +
λ(t)
c
h(t)− 1
4 c
=
2Aσ2 Σ2(t)h2(t)− c σ4
4 (c σ2 + Σ(t)h(t))2
.
Thus we have that h satisfies the ODE (24). Therefore, by Lemma 6, the optimal trading strategy
is given by
θ∗t = β(t) (v − Pt) dt ,
with
β(t) =
1− 2λ(t)h(t)
2 c
,
and the insider’s value function is given by (26).
Now, again with (x1, x2) the unique solution to the FBODE, suppose that the insider’s trading
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strategy is given by
θt = β(t) (v − Pt) dt , (83)
with
β(t) =
σ2
2 (c σ2 + Σ(t)h(t))
,
where Σ(t) = x1(t) and h(t) = x2(t)/x1(t). From (34) we see that Σ satisfies
dΣ(t)
dt
= − σ
2 Σ2(t)
4 (c σ2 + Σ(t)h(t))2
= −σ2 λ2(t) . (84)
In addition we have by their definitions in the statement of the Theorem that
λ(t) =
β(t) Σ(t)
σ2
. (85)
By Lemma 7, the relations in (83), (84), and (85) imply that the efficient pricing rule is given by
dYt = λ(t) dYt , P0 = v0 ,
and that the function Σ also yields the market maker’s conditional variance:
Σ(t) = E[(v − Pt)2|FMt ] .
Finally, when A = 0, applying Lemma 9 gives the closed form expressions
β(t) =
1
λ (T − t) + 2 c ,
λ =
√
Λ2K +
c2
T 2
− c
T
.
as desired. 
6.7. Proof of Proposition 11
As in the proof of Theorem 10, let (x1, x2) be the unique solution to the FBODE (34), and let
Σ(t) = x1(t) and h(t) = x2(t)/x1(t). Then writing
β(t) =
σ2
2 (c σ2 + Σ(t)h(t))
, λ(t) =
Σ(t)
2 (c σ2 + Σ(t)h(t))
,
30
we have that β is increasing if and only if x2 is decreasing. Recalling that
x2(t)
dt
= −σ
2 x1 (c σ
2 + x2 − 2Ax22)
4 (c σ2 + x2)2
,
we have that if x2(t) > 1 +
√
1 + 8Acσ2/(4A), the x′2(t) > 0. However, satisfying these inequalities
for any t would violate the boundary condition x2(T ) = 0, so we must have that x2 is decreasing and
β is increasing.
A straightforward computation shows that
dλ(t)
dt
= − Aσ
2 Σ4(t)h2(t)
4 (c σ2 + Σ(t)h(t))4
,
and so if A > 0 we have that λ is decreasing. 
6.8. Proof of Proposition 12
From Theorem 10 and Proposition 11, the function β is positive, increasing, and satisfies β(T ) =
1/2 c, therefore β is uniformly bounded by 1/2 c. The uniform limit
lim
c→∞
β(t; c) = 0 , (86)
is then immediate. In equilibrium, the pricing rule is given by
λ(t; c) =
β(t; c) Σ(t; c)
σ2
, (87)
and from (30) we have that Σ is a decreasing function of t and therefore bounded by Σ(0; c) = Σv0.
Thus, we also have the limit
lim
c→∞
λ(t; c) = 0 , (88)
uniformly in t.
For the remainder of the proof we only consider A > 0, as the proof for A = 0 is similar and more
straightforward. The limits which correspond to c → 0 rely on some of the results of the proof of
Lemma 9. In particular, the solution to the FBODE (34) must satisfy
dx1
dt
(t; c, k) = f1(x1(t; c, k); c, k) , x1(0; c, k) = Σ
v
0 ,
f1(x1; c, k) = −
16A2 σ2 x21
(
x
γ(c)
1 + k
)2
(
(γ(c) + 1)2 x
γ(c)
1 + (γ(c)− 1)2 k
)2 ,
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where
γ(c) =
√
1 + 8Acσ2 ,
ans where k is chosen so that
(γ(c) + 1) x
γ(c)
1 (T ; c, k)− (γ(c)− 1) k = 0 , (89)
and we have made all dependences on c explicit. Note that all of these expressions above apply to
both cases c > 0 and c = 0, with the provision that the choice of k when c = 0 is the positive root in
(82). Since the function f1 is continuously differentiable with respect to c, so is the solution x1(t; c, k)
(see Hartman (2002)). Additionally, γ is continuously differentiable with respect to c, and so by the
implicit function theorem we may take k = k(c) in view of (89). We then have x2 given by
x2(t; c, k(c)) = ρ(x1(t; c, k(c))) =
(γ(c) + 1) x
γ(c)
1 (t; c, k(c))− (γ(c)− 1) k(c)
4A (x
γ(c)
1 (t; c, k(c)) + k(c))
,
which is also seen to be continuously differentiable with respect to c. Recall that in equilibrium the
trading and pricing rules can be written as
β(t; c) =
σ2
2 (c σ2 + x2(t; c, k(c))
, λ(t; c) =
x1(t; c, k(c))
2 (c σ2 + x2(t; c, k(c))
.
Both of these expressions are continuous functions of t and c except at (t, c) = (T, 0) where both
denominators are equal to 0. Thus, if we restrict t to a compact subinterval on [0, T ) and c to
an interval of the form [0, C], then both β and λ are uniformly continuous with respect to (t, c),
and the expressions given in (47) and (48) are obtained by direct substitution of c = 0 using the
corresponding solutions of x1 and x2 given in Lemma 9. 
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7. Appendix B
This appendix contains the full systems of equations that are solved in the proof of Proposition 4.
7.1. System for λ˜i,j
(
4 λ˜30,0 − 4 λ˜0,0 λ2K
)
= 0 ,(
4 λ˜40,0 σ
2 − 4 λ˜20,0 λ2K σ2 + 12 λ˜1,0 λ˜20,0 − 4 λ˜1,0 λ2K
)
= 0 ,(
12 λ˜20,0 λ˜0,1 − 4 λ˜0,1 λ2K + 8 λ˜20,0 − 8λ2K
)
= 0 ,(
λ˜50,0 σ
4 + 16 λ˜30,0 λ˜1,0 σ
2 + 12 λ˜2,0 λ˜
2
0,0 + 12 λ˜0,0 λ˜
2
1,0 − 8 λ˜0,0 λ˜1,0 λ2K σ2 − 4 λ˜2,0 λ2K
)
= 0 ,(
16 λ˜0,0 λ˜1,0 + 12 λ˜
2
0,0 λ˜1,1 − 4 λ˜1,1 λ2K + 4 λ˜30,0 σ2
+16 λ˜30,0 λ˜0,1 σ
2 + 24 λ˜0,0 λ˜0,1 λ˜1,0 − 8 λ˜0,0 λ˜0,1 λ2K σ2
)
= 0 ,(
12 λ˜0,2 λ˜
2
0,0 + 12 λ˜0,0 λ˜
2
0,1 + 16 λ˜0,0 λ˜0,1 + 4 λ˜0,0 − 4 λ˜0,2 λ2K
)
= 0 ,(
5 λ˜40,0 λ˜1,0 σ
4 + 16 λ˜2,0 λ˜
3
0,0 σ
2 + 24 λ˜20,0 λ˜
2
1,0 σ
2 + 12 λ˜3,0 λ˜
2
0,0 + 24 λ˜2,0 λ˜0,0 λ˜1,0
−8 λ˜2,0 λ˜0,0 λ2K σ2 + 4 λ˜31,0 − 4 λ˜21,0 λ2K σ2 − 4 λ˜3,0 λ2K
)
= 0 ,(
16 λ˜0,0 λ˜2,0 + 12 λ˜0,1 λ˜
2
1,0 + 12 λ˜
2
0,0 λ˜2,1 − 4 λ˜2,1 λ2K + 8 λ˜21,0 + 5 λ˜40,0 λ˜0,1 σ4
+12 λ˜20,0 λ˜1,0 σ
2 + 16 λ˜30,0 λ˜1,1 σ
2 + 24 λ˜0,0 λ˜0,1 λ˜2,0 + 24 λ˜0,0 λ˜1,0 λ˜1,1
+48 λ˜20,0 λ˜0,1 λ˜1,0 σ
2 − 8 λ˜0,0 λ˜1,1 λ2K σ2 − 8 λ˜0,1 λ˜1,0 λ2K σ2
)
= 0 ,(
4 λ˜1,0 + 16 λ˜0,0 λ˜1,1 + 16 λ˜0,1 λ˜1,0 + 12 λ˜
2
0,1 λ˜1,0 + 12 λ˜
2
0,0 λ˜1,2 − 4 λ˜1,2 λ2K
+12 λ˜20,0 λ˜0,1 σ
2 + 16 λ˜30,0 λ˜0,2 σ
2 + 24 λ˜0,0 λ˜0,1 λ˜1,1 + 24 λ˜0,0 λ˜0,2 λ˜1,0
+24 λ˜20,0 λ˜
2
0,1 σ
2 − 4 λ˜20,1 λ2K σ2 − 8 λ˜0,0 λ˜0,2 λ2K σ2
)
= 0 ,(
8 λ˜0,3 λ
2
K − 8
)
= 0 .
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7.2. System for β˜i,j
(
16 β˜40,0 λ
4
K − 1
)
= 0 ,(
16 β˜30,0 λ
4
K σ
2 + 64 β˜1,0 β˜
3
0,0 λ
4
K
)
= 0 ,(
32 β˜50,0 λ
4
K + 64 β˜0,1 β˜
3
0,0 λ
4
K + 16 β˜
3
0,0 λ
2
K + 2 β˜0,0
)
= 0 ,(
64 β˜2,0 β˜
3
0,0 λ
4
K + 96 β˜
2
0,0 β˜
2
1,0 λ
4
K + 48 β˜
2
0,0 β˜1,0 λ
4
K σ
2
)
= 0 ,(
160 β˜1,0 β˜
4
0,0 λ
4
K + 64 β˜1,1 β˜
3
0,0 λ
4
K + 48 β˜0,1 β˜
2
0,0 λ
4
K σ
2
+192 β˜0,1 β˜1,0 β˜
2
0,0 λ
4
K + 48 β˜1,0 β˜
2
0,0 λ
2
K + 2 β˜1,0
)
= 0 ,(
160 β˜40,0 β˜0,1 λ
4
K + 64 β˜0,2 β˜
3
0,0 λ
4
K + 96 β˜
2
0,0 β˜
2
0,1 λ
4
K + 48 β˜
2
0,0 β˜0,1 λ
2
K + 2 β˜0,1
)
= 0 .
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